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Abstract
At 1:30 a.m. on a summer evening, the proprietor of a market,
while locking up his business, sees a man approach with a gun in his
hand.
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I. Introduction
At 1:30 a.m. on a summer evening, the proprietor of a market,
while locking up his business, sees a man approach with a gun in his
hand. The proprietor draws the gun he carries for protection. Shots are
fired and both men are injured. Ambulances transport the two men to
the hospital where the proprietor identifies his alleged assailant, and,
later, police charge him with several felonies. The state attorney now
wants the bullet which is lodged in the alleged felon's chest as evidence.
Surgery using general anesthesia is required to obtain the bullet. Because the alleged felon refuses to undergo this surgical search, the state
seeks a court order to compel his compliance.1
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 2 protects
a person from official intrusion into areas in which one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy,$ absent a showing that the intrusion is reasonable.' When the area to be searched is physical property, a dwelling or
some other structure, the searcher demonstrates reasonableness by establishing probable cause 5 to believe the object sought is in the place
for which a search warrant is to be issued. Once probable cause is
proven, the intrusion is deemed reasonable and the search warrant is
issued.6
1. The facts described are similar to the facts of Winston v. Lee, discussed infra.

2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.

3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. L. WADDINGTON, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE passim (1974).
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), stating that the determination of probable cause shall be decided "by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Id. at 14.
6. L. WADDINGTON, supra note 3, at 9.
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When authorities seek to search an individual, the nature and extent of this intrusion also must not exceed the bounds of the fourth
amendment's protection of an individual's privacy and dignity. The individual's privacy interest must be balanced against the state's interest
in obtaining the evidence. 7 However, a physical search of an individual's body has the potential of being much more intrusive than a premises search since an individual has a stronger expectation of privacy in
the integrity of his body because of its obvious private nature. Since the
expectation of privacy in the contents of one's body is greater than the
expectation of privacy in, for example, the contents of one's dresser
drawers, a mere showing that the evidence is present in the body is
often, by itself, insufficient to meet the reasonableness requirement of
the fourth amendment. Authorities must demonstrate a more compelling need for the search than the mere fact that the evidence is present
in the person's body and that the state needs it. "The overriding function of the fourth amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State." s
When the state desires to search the human body, an evaluation of
the reasonableness of the official conduct begins with a determination
of the characteristics of the intrusion;9 more specifically, whether the
intrusion is an exterior or interior bodily intrusion.10 The evidence
sought may be on the body's surface, in body cavities, or actually
lodged inside the body."' Intrusions on the body's surface are exterior
intrusions, and include as examples scrapings of fingernails and skin, 2
and clippings of hair.' 3 Exterior intrusions are traditionally considered
reasonable because of the very limited nature of the intrusion. The
state's need for the evidence outweighs the individual's privacy interest.
Interior intrusions are classified as intrusions into the body and include
the pinprick necessary for a blood alcohol test, 4 stomach pumping, 15
Elkin v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1d) (1978).
10. See generally Eckhardt, Intrusion into the Body, 52 MIL. L. REV. 141
7.
8.
9.

(1971).
11. Id. at 141.
12. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (scraping of dried blood
from under fingernails).
13. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills), 686 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 386 (1982) (hair samples from scalp and face).
14. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757.
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and the most interior of intrusions, surgery.

6

This note focuses on the

last of these three intrusions: the surgical search.

States which have considered the question of surgical searches differ over the reasonableness of the search, and selectively apply different
standards according to their own particular preferences. Because of
the highly invasive nature of surgical searches, a special set of standards is necessary to determine when such a procedure is a permissible

intrusion and, therefore, a reasonable search for fourth amendment
purposes.

Arguably, the standards utilized to determine the fourth amendment reasonableness of a surgical search, until now, have been necessarily fair and just standards and have provided a flexible, case-by-case
framework for the resolution of this issue. This note, however, advocates the adoption of a bright-line standard, which modern medical
technology requires, to prevent the potential for serious abuse and the
threatened further erosion of the protections afforded an individual by
15. See, e.g., Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
16. See, e.g., Crowder v. United States, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
17. At present, most jurisdictions follow the reasonableness standard set forth in
Schmerber in determining whether a surgical intrusion passes constitutional muster.
These jurisdictions, however, while adopting the general Schmerber approach, may
vary as far as determining the weight to be given to various factors used in balancing
the interests at stake. Some stress location of the evidence in the body as definitive.
Others stress a major/minor surgery distinction. Most jurisdictions take into account
time required for surgery, use of general anesthesia, whether the surgical candidate is
the defendant or a victim/witness, and the presence or absence of consent. See, e.g.,
State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982); State v. Maring, 404 So. 2d 960
(1981); People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978); and
Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972).
In Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
935 (1974), the Indiana Supreme Court held all surgical intrusions per se unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. While the Supreme Court of Georgia also seemed
to endorse a per se rule, the surgical candidate involved was a witness to the crime and
not the defendant. State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713 (1978). Therefore, it
remains unresolved as to whether that court meant to adopt a per se rule in all surgical
intrusion cases, or only in those involving surgical searches of people other than the
defendant.
Also, in Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), affd, Winston v. Lee, 53
U.S.L.W. 4367 (March 20, 1985)(No. 83-1334), petitioners suggested that the respondent wished the United States Supreme Court to apply a per se rule in that case. See
Brief for Petitioners at 9, Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), af/'d, Winston
v. Lee, No. 83-1334 (U.S. March 20, 1985).
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amendment. The previously employed case-by-case analysis
retained only in those few cases not encompassed by the
standard. Declaring all surgical searches requiring the use
anesthesia as unconstitutional per se is the appropriate
standard.

II. The Traditional Bounds of Permissible and Impermissible
Bodily Intrusions: Rochin v. California8 and Schmerber v.
California9
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court began to delineate the boundaries of what constituted a reasonable search for constitutional purposes. Rochin v. Californiaand Schmerber v. Californiabecame the endpoints for what was and was not permissible official
conduct regarding searches of the human body.
Rochin laid the foundation for what constituted impermissible
conduct. In Rochin, after gaining illegal entry to Rochin's home and
bedroom on information that Rochin was selling drugs, police officers
noticed two capsules on his bedside table.2" Rochin quickly grabbed the
pills and shoved them into his mouth 21 in an effort to prevent the police
from obtaining them as evidence against him. A violent struggle ensued
as the officers attempted to pry open the defendant's mouth to retrieve
the capsules. The attempt failed and Rochin swallowed the pills. The
officers then handcuffed Rochin, rushed him to a hospital, and ordered
a doctor, despite Rochin's resistance, to place a tube down the defendant's throat and pump an emetic solution down the tube into Rochin's
stomach. 2 The emetic caused vomiting. The two capsules retrieved
from the vomitus were tested and found to contain morphine. 23
The trial court admitted the capsules into evidence despite
Rochin's objection that the capsules were obtained in such an unorthodox manner. The pills were admitted into evidence even though the
unorthodox means of obtaining them was frankly set forth in the testimony. 24 The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction and the Califor18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

342 U.S. 165 (1952).
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
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nia Supreme Court, without opinion, denied Rochin's petition for a
hearing.25
The United States Supreme Court reversed Rochin's conviction.
Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court did not base the reversal on
fourth amendment grounds, 6 but on the grounds that the method of
obtaining the capsule from Rochin's stomach violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 27 The Court found that the official

conduct was so egregious as to make Rochin's trial fundamentally unfair. "This is conduct which shocks the conscience." 2 This course of
conduct is "bound to offend even hardened sensibilities."2 9 The method
utilized was "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitu-

tional differentiation.""0 Rochin established the first standard. Conduct
which shocked the conscience, offended a sense of justice, and which
ran "counter to the 'decencies of civilized conduct' "s became unreasonable per se and, therefore, in violation of due process. Rochin represents conduct impermissible because it violates due process/fundamental fairness standards. Rochin's prohibition, however, applies only to
the most extreme and outrageous conduct.32
At the other end of the spectrum of reasonableness is Schmerber,
where the United States Supreme Court set the standard for what is

permissible official conduct under the fourth amendment. Schmerber
was involved in an automobile accident. While Schmerber received
25. Id. at 166, 167.
26. The Court did not consider whether this conduct would constitute an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment because this case was decided prior to
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule of Weeks v.
U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914) to the states.
27. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168. The Due Process Clause provides: "No person shall
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...
CONsT. amend. XIV.

"

U.S.

28. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 175.
32. It is clear that the Rochin Court objected to the entire line of official conduct, and did not feel that it was the stomach pumping alone that was particularly
offensive. In fact, subsequent stomach pumping cases have been held to be reasonable
searches. See, e.g., Blefare, 362 F.2d at 870. The court distinguished this case from
Rochin on the fact that the search was a border search, where the state's interest in
obtaining the evidence is very high, and on the fact that the method used to administer
the emetic was not by forced pumping, as in Rochin, but was by a drip method often
used on children. See generally Note, Constitutionality of Stomach Searches, 10
U.S.F.L. REv. 93 (1975).
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treatment in a hospital for injuries sustained in the accident, police officers directed the attending physician to withdraw a blood sample

from Schmerber.3 3 The doctor withdrew the blood and a chemical analysis indicated Schmerber was intoxicated. 4 The blood analysis results
were admitted into evidence at trial over Schmerber's objection.3 5

Schmerber was convicted of driving under the influence and appealed
his non-jury conviction on four grounds. He claimed the introduction
into evidence of the blood alcohol test results: 1) denied him due pro-

cess of law under the fourteenth amendment; 36 2) violated his privilege
against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment; 37 3) violated his
right to counsel under the sixth amendment;38 and 4) violated his right
33. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 (1966).
34. Id. at 759.
35. Id. At trial, defendant's objection was based on the ground that the blood
had been withdrawn in spite of his refusal to consent to the test on the advice of his
counsel. The defendant felt-this non-consensual conduct violated his right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. The Appellate Department of the California Superior Court rejected this argument, as did the United States Supreme Court
on certiorari. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
Quoting Justice Warren's dissent in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 441
(1957), the Schmerber Court noted that it made no "difference whether one states
unequivocally that he objects or resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such
condition that he is unable to protest." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759. The defendant in
Breithaupt was unconscious at the time the blood was withdrawn, and argued a due
process violation based on his inability to object to the procedure. The Court rejected
Breithaupt's due process argument on the precedent of Rochin, stating that such withdrawal of blood did not offend a sense of justice, in that it did not rise to the level of
the objectionable official conduct outlined in the Rochin case. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
In Schmerber, the Court rejected Schmerber's due process argument based on
Breithaupt and Rochin. The Court held the official conduct was simply not offensive
enough to be prohibited on the grounds found violative of due process standards in
Rochin. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760.
36. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
37. Id. The Court held that the defendant's fifth amendment rights had not been
violated since that amendment had never been interpreted broadly enough to cover this
conduct. The fifth amendment privilege extends only to testimonial or communicative
evidence. Since a blood test is not within these categories, fifth amendment rights do
not attach, and the Court rejected this ground for appeal. But cf. United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973)(Marshall, J. dissenting) stating that fifth amendment rights should attach beyond testimonial and communicative evidence to protect
the introduction of any evidence that the government needs a defendant's cooperation
to obtain.
38. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765-66. The argument that the defendant had been
denied a right to counsel was also rejected by the Court. Sixth amendment rights do
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not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment. 39
The Court held that the blood test procedure involved in this case
did not constitute an unreasonable fourth amendment search. 40 The
Court characterized the pinprick necessary for a blood test as a minor
intrusion which the Court considered permissible when performed
under stringently limited conditions such as those present in the facts
of that case. 4 1 Although the Court limited the holding to the facts of
the case, Schmerber, nonetheless, sets forth the factors it considers vital
to an analysis of whether a particular intrusion beneath the body's surface is a reasonable search for fourth amendment purposes.
First, the Schmerber majority believes "[t]he interests in human
dignity and privacy which the fourth amendment protects forbid any
such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. '4 2 Thus, the threshold determination when authorities seek an
unconsented surgical search is whether there is a clear indication beyond mere chance that the evidence sought will be found. 43 This clearindication standard is another way of expressing the elements of probable cause. 4 Rather than expressing the traditional elements of probable
cause, the Court used the term "clear indication" because it wanted to
stress that the same facts used to meet probable cause for the arrest
should not automatically support an intrusive search of the body. 45 In
Schmerber's case, for example, this clear indication was met based on
the smell of his breath and the general indication of intoxication from
his physical appearance. These facts were not the same facts used to
establish probable cause for his initial arrest. Once this clear indication
not attach until the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. See Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972) defining the scope of the "critical stage of the prosecution," which
was held as the time when sixth amendment rights attached in United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967).

The majority held that sixth amendment rights had not attached at the time
Schmerber's blood was taken, since adversarial judicial proceedings had not as yet been
initiated. Therefore, since the defendant "was not entitled to assert the privilege, he has
no greater right because counsel erroneously advised him that he could assert it."
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766.
39. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
40. Id. at 772.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 769-70.
43. Id.
44. Eckhardt, supra note 9, at 150.

45.

Id.
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was present, the circumstances of the search should be examined to
determine if it is fourth-amendment reasonable.
The Court outlined the factors it believed determinative of the reasonableness of a search. These factors include: 1) whether the procedure itself is reasonable, considering the extent of the procedure, and
taking into account the effectiveness and widespread use, if any, of the
procedure; 2) whether the performance of the procedure is done in a
reasonable manner; e.g., whether it is done by a physician in a hospital
environment according to accepted medical practices; and 3) whether
there is a virtual absence of risk, trauma, or pain for most persons.46
After setting forth these factors, the Schmerber Court emphasized that
its holding was limited to minor bodily intrusions under these stringently limited conditions and gave no indication that it would permit
"more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
The blood test in Schmerber represents the least-invasive interior bodily intrusion, and the Court's decision sets forth the factors determinative of permissible fourth amendment conduct.48
Therefore, utilizing Rochin's standards for impermissible official
conduct at one end, and Schmerber's standards for permissible official
conduct at the other, one could logically envision these cases on a line
continuum of search behavior. 49 At the far right end of the line is
Rochin. At the far left of the line is Schmerber. Somewhere in the
middle of the line is conduct which violates the fourth amendment as
an unreasonable search. All conduct so outrageous, by Rochin standards, that it is violative of due process, would also be violative of the
fourth amendment. All conduct conforming to Schmerber standards
would not be violative of either due process or the fourth amendment,
because it is considered a minor intrusion justified by necessity and is
therefore reasonable. In the middle of this behavior continuum is con46. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
47. Id. at 772.
48. Since Schmerber, blood alcohol tests are generally considered reasonable
searches under the fourth-amendment analysis. Therefore, several states have passed
statutes to provide more protection from bodily intrusions for blood samples. These socalled implied consent statutes allow the police to take blood only upon the driver's
consent. Refusal to consent, however, will generally result in suspension of one's
driver's license. For a discussion of the constitutional and statutory issues involving
implied consent, exemplified by Florida's implied consent statute, see Dobson, Florida's
New "Drunk Driving" Laws: An Overview of Constitutionaland Statutory Problems,
7 NOVA L.J. 179 (1983).
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duct which is more intrusive than that at issue in Schmerber and which
violates the fourth amendment, but yet does not rise to the level of a
Rochin "due process, fundamental fairness violation.
The conduct with which this note is concerned falls in the middle
of this continuum and concerns the most intrusive of bodily searches:
surgical searches. Most surgical searches arise when the state desires to
retrieve bullets from a criminal suspect's body which the state needs to
use as evidence against him.
III.

The Bullet Cases

Courts which have considered cases questioning the permissibility
of court-ordered surgical searches for bullets have held such procedures
constitutionally permissible when justified under the circumstances and
when performed in the proper manner. 50 Extending the factors set forth
49.
Schmerber

Surgical Searches

Rochin

conduct violating neither the
fourth amendment nor due process
conduct violating the fourth
amendment but not violative of
due process

WIILE111

conduct violating the fourth
amendment and due process

50. See, e.g., Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974); Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974);
543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
United
v. Crowder,
Published
by States
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1985
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by the foundation cases of Rochin and Schmerber, these courts have
considered three categories of criteria in determining the reasonableness of surgical searches for bullets.
The first inquiry is forthright and usually easy to satisfy: whether
the evidence is relevant and "could have been obtained in no other way,
and whether there was probable cause to believe that the operation
would produce it."51 This consideration, set forth in United States v.
Crowder,52 is similar to the Schmerber requirement that there be a
clear indication the evidence sought will be found. 53 If this threshold
inquiry is not met, the fourth amendment analysis terminates. For if
the evidence is not relevant, or there is no probable cause to believe it
even exists, then the search for it would be unreasonable under the
fourth amendment since the fourth amendment was designed specifically with the intention of preventing all general searches based on official curiosity alone.54
The one problem which may arise in this threshold-inquiry area is
that the bullet may have become unidentifiable due to deterioration
while in contact with bodily fluids. If deterioration occurs, then the bullet may not be used as evidence since identification of the caliber and,
thus, the source of the bullet is unreliable.55 Therefore, "[g]iven the
possibility that the bullet will be unidentifiable, it is not certain that
evidence will be found."'56 While the court in Lee v. Winston57 raised
the question, it simply stated that it was satisfied that in that case there
was a clear indication that evidence would be found, but did not elaborate on its reasons for that satisfaction. In most cases, however, this
first inquiry can easily be addressed and resolved. For example, often xrays can determine with great accuracy whether the evidence certainly
exists and in what condition it is.
The second important inquiry in surgical-search bullet cases concerns the location of the bullet. Location is not restricted to where the
bullet is located in the body; for example, the head, arm, leg, or chest.
(1977); State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982).
51. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316.
52. Id. at 312.
53. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
54. See generally L. WADDINGTON, supra note 3.
55. Winston v. Lee, 551 F. Supp. 247, 252 (E.D. Va. 1982). See also Lee, 717
F.2d at 888. An analysis of the length of time necessary for bullet deterioration and its
attendant questions is beyond the scope of this article.
56. Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 252 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 247.
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The location inquiry determines how deeply within the area the bullet
rests and how near other structures, for example, nerves, organs, or
blood vessels, the bullet may lie.18 The position of the bullet within the
the surgery as either major or
body often helps the court to categorize
9
5
minor, based on medical testimony.
The third inquiry, which overlaps somewhat with the major/minor

surgery determination, concerns the procedure necessary to remove the

bullet. The courts elaborate upon the basic guidelines of Schmerber. In
addition to the guideline as to whether the surgery is performed "by a
physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical
practices, '

60

courts consider the time needed to perform the surgery,6 '

possible danger to the defendant's life or limb, 2 and the major surgery
versus minor surgery distinction.63 Inquiry includes whether a general
58. See, e.g., Crowder, 543 F.2d at 312 (surgical removal of bullet in defendant's
arm reasonable; from defendant's leg, unreasonable); Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291
S.E.2d at 459 (surgical removal of bullet in defendant Allen's left chest, less than onequarter inch below the skin is reasonable; surgical removal of bullet in defendant
Childer's left thoracic "gutter" unreasonable). See also State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d
505 (Mo. App. 1979) (surgery reasonable to obtain bullet four inches below skin since
there were no vital organs in that area). But see Bowden, 256 Ark. at 820, 510 S.W.2d
at 879 (surgical removal of bullet from defendant's spinal canal unreasonable); State v.
Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (1977)(surgical removal of bullet from buttocks
reasonable).
59. See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 312; Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291 S.E.2d at 459;
Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 505; Bowden, 256 Ark. at 820, 510 S.W.2d at 879; Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d at 621.
60. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
61. See, e.g., Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291 S.E.2d at 459 (15 minutes indicative of
minor intrusion and thus reasonable); Creamer, 229 Ga. at 511, 192 S.E.2d at 350
(reasonable if surgery under local anesthesia and did not exceed 15 minutes).
62. See, e.g., Bowden, 256 Ark. at 822, 510 S.W.2d at 881. There was medical
testimony that fatal risk was involved with surgery. While doctors recommended removal of the bullet for purposes of defendant's health, the court did not sanction removal of the bullet as evidence since the risk of fatality from the procedure would
make the search unreasonable. The court did not address whether the bullet, obtained
by surgery for the defendant's health, could then be obtained from the doctors for use
as evidence at trial. See also Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291 S.E.2d at 459, 464. Even
though the court held Allen's surgery to be reasonable and thus ordered it to be performed, the order also provided that if at any time during surgery "danger to the life of
Larry Ford Allen develops such removal procedures shall cease and such steps shall be
taken as may be necessary to protect the health and life of Larry Ford Allen." Id.
63. See, e.g., Crowder, 543 F.2d at 312 (operation minor and therefore reasonable); Bowden, 256 Ark. at 820, 510 S.W.2d at 879 (major surgical intrusion into spinal
canal unreasonable).
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anesthesia or a local anesthesia is necessary.64 The three considerations
of certainty the evidence will be found, bullet location, and where the
surgery must be performed, taken together, arguably comprise a total-

ity of the circumstances approach to this fourth amendment analysis.
Using this totality of the circumstances approach on a case-by-case ba-

sis, and balancing all the factors affecting an individual's privacy interests in his own body, all courts considering surgical searches for bullets
have found these searches reasonable in all cases where the proposed

surgery falls within the "ambit of Schmerber"65 and within the factors
developed by "subsequent bullet-removal cases from other jurisdic-

tions." 66 Most courts hold that "[tihe human body is not, of course, a
sanctuary in which evidence may be concealed with impunity. . . . Appropriate procedures to retrieve such evidence are neither 'unreasona-

ble' per se under the fourth amendment, nor violations of 'due process'
procedures guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.

67

In fact, only one court holds such surgical searches per se unconstitutional.6 8 The defendant in Adams v. State69 sought to preclude the

surgical removal of bullet fragments from his buttocks. Despite the fact
that the surgery could be accomplished under local anesthesia, the Indiana Supreme Court held, on the authority of Rochin, that any such

bodily intrusion constitutes a fourth amendment violation per se.7 0 Arguably, however, the Court's reliance on Rochin is misplaced. It was
not the stomach pumping intrusion alone which violated Rochin's
rights, but the totality of the official misconduct. Rochin involved an

illegal entry of the home and an abusive struggle to open Rochin's
mouth in addition to the "forcible extraction of his stomach's
64. See, e.g., Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 247. The district court ordered surgery as
reasonable since it could be accomplished with local anesthesia. While the defendant
was being x-rayed in preparation for surgery, the location of the bullet was determined
to be deeper within the defendant's chest wall, thus necessitating the use of general
anesthesia. When presented with this new evidence, the court in a supplemental opinion
rescinded its order of surgery based on its belief that the changed circumstances necessitating the use of general anesthesia now made the surgery unreasonable under the
fourth amendment. See also Lee, 717 F.2d at 888.
65. Allen, 277 S.C. at 595, 291 S.E.2d at 463.
66. Id.
67. People v. Scott, 21 Cal.3d 284, 293, 578 P.2d 123, 127, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876,
880 (1978).
68. See Adams, 260 Ind. at 663, 299 N.E.2d at 834. See also supra note 16.
69. Id.
70. Adams, 260 Ind. at 663, 299 N.E.2d at 834.
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contents.""'
An argument suggests 71 the Adams Court's reliance on Rochin
was also misplaced based on the fact that Rochin was a due process
case and not a fourth amendment case. 73 However, since both due process and fourth amendment analyses are used to measure official conduct, it is perfectly proper to invoke the Rochin standard when, as in
Adams, the Court is examining search behavior. The Indiana Supreme
Court is the only court in the nation to adopt a per se rule of unconstitutionality regarding surgical searches. An argument rightly asserts
that, even assuming the Adams holding is valid, "this single case
hardly constitutes a 'line' of authority. '74 Arguably, however, it is not a
line of authority that is needed in order for a per se rule to be a viable
tool in determining the reasonableness of search conduct. What is
needed, instead, is a correct authority. As set forth above, it appears
that reliance on Rochin under the Adams facts is misplaced and that
Adams is not the correct authority that is needed. But this is not, as
petitioners suggest, because Rochin was decided on due process
grounds and Adams is a fourth amendment case, but instead because
the Adams Court misapprehended the reason for the due process violation. Due process was not violated on the search intrusion alone, but by
the totality of the misconduct engaged in by the Rochin officers. Therefore, holding the Adams search alone per se violative of due process,
without more, is not a proper conclusion to be drawn from the facts of
Rochin. The holding of Adams appears to be aberrant and not a conclusive test of this issue by any means.
It is, therefore, apparent that the analysis presently utilized to determine the fourth-amendment reasonableness of surgical searches for
bullets consists of a case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances approach. In applying this approach, the courts rely on a consideration of
the factors developed by Schmerber and elaborated upon by the subsequent bullet removal cases.
IV.

Winston v. Lee: The Fourth Amendment's Protective
Door Left Ajar

With improved medical technology, the validity and usefulness of
71.
72.
73.

Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d at 888.
Brief for Petitioners at 10-I1, Lee, 717 F.2d at 888.

74. Brief for Respondents at 15, Lee, 717 F.2d at 888.
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these traditional standards as a means of measuring constitutionally
reasonable conduct for fourth amendment purposes has come into question. The most recent surgical search case to be decided by the United
States Supreme Court in the light of the above factors is Winston v.
Lee.75 The Court heard oral argument, 7" and recently rendered an
opinion that court ordered surgical removal of the bullet imbedded in
Mr. Lee's chest would violate the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.77 By so holding, the Court
halted the attack on Mr. Lee's fourth amendment protection against an
unreasonable search. However, by failing to adopt a bright-line standard, the Court, though well intentioned, has left future defendants'
fourth amendment protections vulnerable.
A proprietor of a market shot defendant Lee in the left side of the
chest when he saw Lee approach with a gun in his hand. 78 Lee shot the
proprietor in the leg. The two men were transported separately to the
hospital for treatment, where the proprietor identified Lee as the man
79
who shot him.
Lee was charged with four felony counts and the Commonwealth
attorney for the City of Richmond filed a motion to compel the surgical
removal of the bullet from Lee's chest. Lee refused to undergo the surgery voluntarily.80 Hearings to determine the reasonableness of the proposed court ordered surgery were held in the state circuit court. Based
on testimony that the bullet was 0.5 centimeters below the skin, that
local anesthesia could be used, and that there was little risk of harm or
injury to the defendant, the court found this surgery reasonable, but
stayed the performance of the surgery pending appellate review of the
order. 8 ' Lee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a writ of
prohibition with the Supreme Court of Virginia, which summarily denied the writs.82 After exhausting his state remedies, Lee petitioned the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for
habeas corpus relief. The defendant again raised the issue that compelling this surgery would violate his rights under the fourth amend-

75.
76.
1984.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

53 U.S.L.W. 4367 (March 20, 1985)(No. 83-1334).
The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on October 31,
Winston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4367 (March 20, 1985)(No. 83-1334).
Lee, 717 F.2d at 890.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 890-91.
Id. at 891.
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ment. 83 After hearing evidence of the shallow bullet location and the
virtual lack of risk to the defendant under local anesthesia, the district
court authorized the surgery to proceed.84
Pre-surgical x-rays, however, indicated the bullet was in a deeper
position in the chest wall than originally believed. The bullet was approximately 2.5 to 3.0 centimeters below the skin's surface.8 5 With this
new information, Lee petitioned for rehearing due to changed circumstances. Medical testimony indicated, in addition to the newly established depth of the bullet, that the bullet was imbedded in muscle tissue and that the more extensive surgery necessary to remove the bullet
would require general anesthesia. 86 In a supplemental opinion, the district court, after reviewing this evidence in the light of Rochin,
Schmerber, and their progeny, rescinded its order of surgery and permanently enjoined the procedure.8 7 The court held that this procedure
went "far beyond the prick of a needle in Schmerber, the slight intrusion in Crowder, and the minor procedure originally supposed to be
required in this matter." ' The district court did not identify any single
element of the proposed procedure as the linchpin of its determination
that this intrusion would be unreasonable, but said that "the fact that
general anesthesia is involved is very important to the Court's [sic] conclusion that the procedure shocks the conscience."89 In emphasizing
that such a procedure as the surgery contemplated here could not be
said to involve "virtually no . . . trauma" 90 by Schmerber standards,

the court stated that it was "appalled at the prospect of government
authorities rendering a person unconscious, cutting him open, and probing around inside his body for evidence which might, or indeed might
not, aid them in convicting him of a crime."91
The state appealed this reversal to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals9" which affirmed the district court's holding that surgery
would violate Lee's fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 247.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
Id. at 261.
Lee, 717 F.2d at 888.
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searches.93 The Fourth Circuit, stating that "fourth amendment questions are peculiarly fact-specific," 9 4 indicated that there was a sufficient
body of case law on the specific facts peculiar to bullet removal from
which the court could draw guidance as to a general principle.9 5 The
Fourth Circuit believed that the general principle to be utilized was
that once the state has shown the evidence is relevant and can be obtained in no other way, "the reasonableness of removing it forcibly
from a person's body is judged by the extent of the surgical intrusion
and the extent of the risks to the subject." 96 In adopting this principle,
the Fourth Circuit utilized the test applied in the majority of surgical
search cases; arguably the totality of the circumstances approach.
Since this surgery was not medically necessary to the patient's health,
and involved general anesthesia and a more invasive procedure than
originally thought, Lee's risk of pain, trauma, and injury, was increased. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held it was not surgically reasonable and, therefore, not constitutionally reasonable.
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,9 7 the petitioners in Winston v. Lee argued that the proposed surgery was constitutionally reasonable. Petitioners state that it is "very common in the
1980's to place patients under general anesthesia." 98 Citing the increasing incidence of outpatient surgical procedures using general anesthesia, petitioners suggested that surgery under general anesthesia has
risen to the routine-procedure status of the Schmerber blood alcohol
test. Stressing the doctor's preference that an uncooperative surgical
candidate be rendered unconscious through general anesthesia, 99 the
state analogized the substantial risk of this major surgical procedure to,
what they termed, the substantial risk involved in "waking up, getting
dressed and eating breakfast in the morning." ' It can be inferred
from this argument that the state believed the district court's concern
over the forced use of general anesthesia to render a person unconscious, cut him open, and probe around in his body was an antiquated
concern, no longer reasonable in the enlightened technology of 1984.
"In the 20th century, with the modern medical advances that have
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 901.
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id.
Writ of certiorari was granted April 16, 1984.
Supra note 70, at 16.
Id. at 16, 17.
Id. at 17.
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been made, this surgery is not unreasonable at all."' 1
The respondent referred to petitioners' "marvels of modern sci'
ence '' 2 as "claims made without reference to the record or to any
legal, medical, or scientific literature.' 10 3 Referring to the dissent rendered in the court below, the respondent characterized this surgical
search as an assault on the body and dignity of Mr. Lee,104 and urged
the Court not to be the first to authorize a surgical search which would
require general anesthesia. 05
The record of Winston indicates that it would be difficult to satisfy
even the threshold inquiry utilized by several previous surgical search
cases involving bullets; i.e., whether the evidence is relevant, and
"could have been obtained in no other way.' 0 6 Lee did not share the
district court's conviction that there was a clear indication the evidence
would be found,' 0 7 nor that it would then meet the relevance test. In
addition to a concern that the bullet might be unidentifiable because of
the effect of bodily fluids upon it, Lee was concerned that there was a
probability the specimen would be useless, because there would be
nothing to compare it with, 08 since the proprietor's gun would not be
capable of refirings.' 0 9 If proven true, these facts suggest the bullet
would not be admissible as relevant evidence even if obtained.
Even assuming the bullet is identifiable, and therefore relevant evidence, Lee asserted this evidence could be obtained and demonstrated
by the use of x-rays and medical testimony, and that he could be identified through the testimony of the proprietor of the market. This argument by Lee seems to negate compliance with the requirement that the
evidence could be obtained in no other way. Since a showing of the
evidence's relevance, in addition to a showing that the evidence can be
obtained in no other way, is a threshold requirement which must be
met before further analysis of the factors concerning bullet location
and surgical procedure is undertaken, it appears that this surgical
search would not be considered a reasonable one under the precedents
101. See Reaves, Bullet Battle, A.B.A.J., Jan. 1984, at 28 (quoting petitioners'
attorney Stacy Garrett).
102. Supra note 71, at 6.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id.
106. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316.
107. See supra note 53.
108. Supra note 71, at 7.
109. Id.
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of fourth amendment case law.
Even assuming, arguendo, the desired Winston surgical search met
the first inquiry, the location of the bullet imbedded in the muscle tissue, and the extent of the procedure necessitating the use of general
anesthesia, in themselves, fall outside previous parameters of reasonable surgical searches. For the Supreme Court to hold this surgery reasonable would have necessitated a radical extension of the standards set
forth in prior case law, opening the door to a new era resulting in the
further erosion of rights protected by the fourth amendment. Thus, the
Supreme Court's holding is sound in Mr. Lee's case, but the danger to
others' fourth amendment rights continues. Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment only. 110 From this, it can be reasonably inferred that at least two members of the Court feel the majority's opinion is lacking a complete resolution, even though the correct
result was reached.
Arguably, the Court applied a 1966 Schmerber balancing approach"' to a 1985 Orwellian case. The danger in using Schmerber lies
in the unaddressed possibilities of the future. The pending question after Winston is whether any surgical search requiring general anesthesia
will be fourth-amendment reasonable as soon as some state convinces
the Court it is as routine in, for example, 1990 as the Schmerber blood
test was in 1966. This analysis ignores the vast difference between the
minor intrusion of a needle stick versus a major intrusion several inches
into the chest wall. In fact, the Court states such a minor/major characterization is not controlling in their view." 2
Arguably, Schmerber's case-by-case approach is inadequate.
While the totality-of-the-circumstances and the balancing-the-factors
approaches have served the interests of justice over the last thirty
years, technology has advanced to a point where it can too easily stack
those factors against the individual's interest in the sanctity of his person. The case law must move with the decades. Therefore, arguably,
the Court should have drawn a bright-line standard saying, in effect,
"beyond this point, you shall not go."
V.

A Proposed Chalkline

While a totality-of-the-circumstances approach has worked well in
110.
111.
112.

Winston, U.S.
Id. at9.
Id. at 10-11 n.99.

-,
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the past, Winston v. Lee demonstrated the fact that this test is hard to
apply in the shadows of developing technology. Even while signaling a
need for a more structured framework for the analysis of these delicate
fourth amendment searches, Winston, itself, suggested where the courts
can draw the first line of that framework. While the district court was
hesitant to cite a single factor as controlling its belief that the surgery
involved was unreasonable, 113 it still acknowledged that the use of general anesthesia was important to its decision.
General anesthesia is a logical, just and fair place to draw a line
limiting the state's intrusion inside the human body. It is also a sufficiently flexible standard. For example, if the surgery is elective, courts
can draw the line at general anesthesia and hold all procedures requiring it constitutionally unreasonable. If, however, the surgery is necessary to the health of the defendant, such that the surgery would be
required anyway, a court could allow the use of the evidence obtained
from this surgery since the general anesthesia was necessary for the
surgery, not the search.
An unreasonable search is characterized as one violative of the
sanctity, dignity, and privacy of the human body." 4 What could be
more violative of that sanctity than the restraint and control exercised
by rendering one's conscious mind inactive and ransacking through the
body in search of evidence to be used against one, should one survive
the procedure itself? The potential for abuse is vast. For if we justify
bodily searches involving general anesthesia on the basis of our technological advances, we must inevitably justify a search of one's mind
whenever our technology reaches that level of sophistication-only on
probable cause, of course.
The Framers of the fourth amendment did not have the resources
to foresee the possibilities inherent in the general language of the
amendment they drafted. But our jurisprudence and science fiction
make us better soothsayers. In order to prevent the abuses within our
technological grasp, it makes sense to draw the line at general anesthesia and say, "beyond this point, you shall not go."
VI.

Conclusion

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the sanctity of the individual from unreasonable searches and seizures.
113.

Lee, 551 F. Supp. at 261.

114. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
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The surgical search of the human body is the most intrusive search
possible. While traditionally case law has balanced the totality of the
circumstances on a case-by-case basis to determine the reasonableness
of a surgical search, technology is forcing the courts to structure more
carefully a framework for this delicate fourth amendment analysis in
order to prevent the potential abuses inherent in runaway jurisprudence. A special standard is necessary to test a particular surgical
search for constitutional reasonableness. A rational, workable, special
standard is a simple bright-line rule. An intrusion requiring the use of
general anesthesia should be held per se constitutionally unreasonable
absent a special, clear showing that general anesthesia was necessary
for the defendant's health or life, and not necessary for the surgical
search alone. Only by such a bright-line rule can the potential for serious abuse be curtailed and the further erosion of fourth amendment
rights be halted.
Robin S. Richards
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